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Abstract 
The last decade has witnessed the development of pernicious polarization in Brazil, partly due 
to the emergence of right-wing organizations promoting a conservative, populist-nationalist and 
neoliberal agenda. Despite the attention that this process has received, the viewpoints of 
individuals who identify themselves as part of the right-wing have been overlooked. This article 
aims to address this gap, drawing on twenty-one semi-structured interviews with members of 
right-wing organization Movimento Brasil Livre. By analyzing the interviews through the 
philosophy of Paulo Freire, we show how these individuals propose a narrative of oppression 
that echoes in form but not substance Freire’s ideas of conscientization and liberation. We also 
suggest that a Freirean approach opens new ways to discuss and potentially unlock pernicious 
polarization, incorporating a significant distinction between sectarians and radicals, with the 
former unreceptive to criticism and discussion, and the latter defending their positions but open 
to dialogue and listening. 




Thousands of Brazilians took to the streets in cities all over the country on 15 March 2015. 
They protested against economic recession, the corruption scandals exposed by Operação Lava 
Jato –an investigation into a bribery network involving the entire political spectrum, including 
former presidents Fernando Collor de Mello and, notably, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva–, and 
demanded the impeachment of then President Dilma Rousseff. Relatively new conservative or 
right-wing opposition groups, such as Movimento Brasil Livre and Vem Pra Rua were behind 
these demonstrations, which were attended mostly by middle or upper class people (Davis and 
Straubhaar, 2020). The demonstrations continued throughout 2015 and 2016, with members of 
these and other groups promoting a conservative, populist-nationalist, neoliberal and even 
sometimes militarist agenda, whilst depicting the then governing Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT, Workers’ Party) as a source of corruption, authoritarianism and inefficiency, and da Silva 
and Rousseff as political figures to topple.  
The legal but highly questionable impeachment of Rousseff in August 2016 added fuel 
to this situation. Right-wing organizations continued to grow during the government of 
Rousseff’s replacement, her controversial Vice-president Michel Temer, and the subsequent 
presidential campaign that ended in the victory of right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro in late 
2018. The emergence of these groups contributed to a significant social and political shift in 
the country. Dichotomies between the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ were replaced by a growing 
perception of ‘pernicious polarization’ (following McCoy and Somer, 2019), partly due to the 
increasing visibility of a radicalized right that did not tolerate any deviation from its own 
position and pledged for the symbolic, but also sometimes corporeal, neutralization of ‘the 
enemy.’ The 2018 presidential campaign election was particularly vitriolic. Lula was forced to 
abandon the race after being jailed accused of corruption –but released from prison eighteen 
months later–, and Bolsonaro’s supporters voiced on the streets and social media anti-
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establishment and antipetistas (anti-PT) views (Hunter and Power, 2019; Davis and Straubhaar, 
2020). Notably, one of the numerous targets of Bolsonaro’s backers was Paulo Freire and his 
legacy, accused of being responsible for a supposed ‘communist brainwashing’ of Brazil’s 
educational system (see Waisbord, this issue). 
As stressed throughout this special issue, whilst Paulo Freire’s main concern was 
education, his philosophical project ultimately aimed to achieve a broader transformation of 
society, particularly in view of persistent social inequalities in Brazil and Latin America during 
the 1950s and 1960s (see Peruzzo, this issue). Hence, and without completely abandoning an 
emphasis on education, some have drawn on Freire’s philosophy –beyond the specificities of 
pedagogic methods– to address broader questions about democracy, the social pervasiveness of 
neoliberalism as well as political polarization (e.g. Bolin, 2017; O’Cadiz, Wong and Torres, 
2018; Holst, 2019). Whilst our focus is on communication rather than education, we agree that 
the philosophy of Paulo Freire, particularly his ideas on dialogue, sectarianism and 
radicalization, can open up new paths to discuss and even unlock processes of pernicious 
polarization affecting societies in conflict, such as Brazil.  
Drawing on twenty-one interviews with activists from right-wing organization 
Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL, Free Brazil Movement), this article aims to examine perceptions 
about the recent process of social and political pernicious polarization in Brazil through the 
eyes of these individuals. We start with a conceptual and contextual overview, examining what 
we understand pernicious polarization to be, and addressing how this process has been 
manifested in Brazil in the last decade. We then look at how right-wing activists proposed a 
narrative of oppression to explain the rise of the right in Brazil, with chronological stages of 
alleged ‘victimization’, ‘conscientization’ and ‘liberation.’ Although these stages seem to echo 
Freire’s philosophy, we are aware that these similarities are in form rather than substance. 
Finally, we suggest that the philosophy of Paulo Freire can open new avenues of thought to 
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unlock the process of pernicious polarization in Brazil, enhancing the possibility of dialogue 
and incorporating a significant distinction between sectarians, closed within their view of the 
world, and radicals, who aim for social change but are open to dialogue and listening, even 
when disagreeing with the other. 
Brazil’s Growing Pernicious Polarization 
A competitive gamut of political positions –usually articulated in terms of right and left-wing– 
is a normal feature of a healthy democracy. When differences are taken to the extreme, and 
electorates separate out into antagonistic, distrustful camps that perceive the ‘other’ as an 
existential threat, social and political ‘pernicious polarization’ emerges (Somer and McCoy, 
2019). Hence, pernicious polarization does not simply refer to the distance between ideologies, 
but rather alludes to circumstances when ‘political identity becomes a social identity, and it 
takes on characteristics of political tribalism in which members of each camp feel loyalty and 
sympathy toward their own political group and distrust and antipathy toward the other’ (Somer 
and McCoy, 2019, p. 9). Whilst pernicious polarization is relational, the existence of an extreme 
right-wing along with an equally extreme left-wing is not a pre-requisite for this to happen. 
Traditionally, leaders or organizations of one specific political tendency promote it initially, 
simplifying the normal multiplicity of society viewpoints into a Manichean politics of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ (Somer and McCoy, 2019).  
Pressure to conform with the messages and beliefs of one camp may be conducive to 
gridlock and careening, a deepening of pre-existing crises, and post-truth politics, with facts 
bent to favour one’s position and erode rival ones. Furthermore, when opposition to extreme 
groups –even by those in the political centre– is driven by equally Manichean terms and 
attitudes, the process of pernicious polarization may deepen, narrowing the possibility of 
negotiation and agreement (McCoy and Somer, 2019). Pernicious polarization can therefore 
undermine democracy, opening the door to institutional collapse, authoritarianism or populism. 
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The latter is underpinned by stressing and exploiting the perceived antagonism between a 
governing ‘elite’ vis-a-vis a supposedly underdog ‘people’ (Stavrakakis, 2018). 
The political and economic stability enjoyed by Brazil since the late 1990s and 
particularly during the first decade of the 21st century, led some to argue that the country had 
consolidated its party system, with most electors gravitating around the policies of either the 
centre-left PT or the centre-right PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira –Brazilian 
Social Democracy Party) (Braga and Pimentel, 2011; Borges and Vidigal, 2018). Since 2013 
however, it has been argued that Brazil has fallen into a growing process of pernicious 
polarization, manifested by, among other things, a lack of trust of politicians, the dissatisfaction 
of the left due to the weakening of ties between the PT governments and social movements, and 
the significance of lulismo and anti-petismo as identity markers. This all facilitated the 
emergence of Jair Bolsonaro and the resonance of his extreme views among significant portions 
of the electorate (Hunter and Power, 2019; Davis and Straubhaar, 2020). Consequently, the 
various demonstrations that have stormed Brazil in the last decade have been interpreted as both 
triggers and expressions of such pernicious polarization (Hunter and Power, 2019; Davis and 
Straubhaar, 2020). 
Brazilian commentators and academics have argued that this pernicious polarization, 
partly fueled by social media, not only facilitated Bolsonaro’s election, but deepened further 
during his government, with a clear division between government supporters scorned as 
‘bolsominions’ and PT followers nicknamed ‘petralhas’ (Ortellado and Ribeiro, 2018; Gomes, 
Bridi and Lara, 2019). Pundits have consequently warned about the possible implications of 
Bolsonaro’s extreme views for Brazilian democracy (Muggah, 2018),  have complained about 
the apparent stupidity of voters (as observed by Welp, 2018), and have proposed means for a 
centrism rebirth (de Campos, Zylberkan and Paduan, 2019). Recent surveys seem to confirm 
this polarizing trend, with studies arguing that a majority of Brazilians are less willing to engage 
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with individuals who hold different views (Gomes, Bridi and Lara, 2019; Simonard, 2020). 
Evidence however suggests that pernicious polarization in Brazil is actually underpinned only 
by perceptions, rather than irreconcilable differences (Ortellado, Solano and Moretto, 2016). 
Contemporary social and political developments have nonetheless hardened political opinions 
and identities across the country, with opposing perspectives dismissed in simplistic terms and 
political projects becoming impossible to dissociate from religious, family, social and economic 
viewpoints. Politics in Brazil, particularly after the election of Jair Bolsonaro, have apparently 
become a zero-sum game, characterized –especially among Bolsonaro’s most vocal supporters– 
by purism and passions leading to arguments of being ‘either with me or against me’, and 
leaving very limited space for compromise and negotiation.  
Methodology: Talking to the Right-Wing 
Despite the increasing attention that the process of pernicious polarization in Brazil has 
received, discussions have largely overlooked the viewpoints of individuals who identify 
themselves as part of the right-wing. There has been some work examining media content 
produced by these individuals, particularly through social media networks (e.g. Romancini and 
Castilho, 2019; Zanini and Tatagiba, 2019; Davis and Straubhaar, 2020), and on surveys 
conducted during protest episodes (Ortellado, Solano and Moretto, 2016). Few studies (e.g. 
Barbieri, 2015; Silva, 2016; Rocha, 2019) have directly addressed the perceptions and 
viewpoints of these individuals. 
The scarcity of interviews with right-wing individuals and organizations is partly due to 
the difficult of accessing them, as observed in other settings (e.g. Atkinson and Suzanne, 2012). 
In our own experience, individuals identifying as right-wing expressed distrust towards 
academics, labelling them as leftist activists. In turn, some academics also expressed sectarian 
positions, denigrating the value of research about the right-wing, for considering that the right-
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wing had nothing of value to say. Yet the growth and socio-political significance of these 
individuals and organizations in Brazil and elsewhere make them impossible to ignore.  
The focus of this article is on Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL). This group was officially 
funded on November 2014, directly after the re-election of Dilma Rousseff, yet it emerged from 
a previous organization called Movimento Renovação Liberal (Liberal Renewal Movement), 
which was born after the June 2013 protests. Founders changed the name to another one more 
aligned with the spirit of a social movement and that also mocked the name of Movimento Passe 
Livre (Free Fare Movement), an activist group behind some of the early demonstrations of June 
2013 (Davis and Straubhaar, 2020; Jiménez-Martínez, 2020). As mentioned earlier, the MBL 
was one of the main organizations behind the protests demanding the impeachment of Dilma 
Rousseff.  
Twenty-one semi-structured interviews were carried out with activists belonging to the 
MBL between November 2015 and July 2017, until data saturation was reached. A sampling 
strategy was followed (Weiss, 1994), with people suggesting or helping us to contact other 
participants. Some of the interviewees were among the main leaders and founders of the MBL, 
and others were activists who joined the organization in 2015 and 2016. All were under thirty-
years old, and three were females. The interviews were conducted in Portuguese, in São Paulo, 
although some were also carried out during a protest outside the National Congress in Brasília 
in 2015. All interviews were anonymized.  
We attempted to apply Freire’s ideas on dialogue, trying to put the interviewee at ease, 
without apprehension or moral judgements, in order to understand why and how these 
individuals committed themselves to the movement. A Freirean approach meant that, in order 
to understand the ‘vision of the world’ of each informant, we had to be conducive to the creation 
of a ‘safe environment’, where beliefs and values could be cautiously listened to and considered. 
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Hence, despite our own feelings and beliefs about their claims, we did not adopt a normative 
position or put their actions in jeopardy. Without this approach, informants could have simply 
dismissed the interview or even claimed it out as another piece of pernicious polarization.  
Being non-Brazilian facilitated these exchanges, because the interviewer was seen as an 
outsider. Interviewees were asked about their trajectory as activists, as well as their motivations 
behind joining the movement. The interviews were later transcribed and analyzed.  We looked 
for patterns of commitment, similarities in narratives as well as their relationship with social 
media contents. Hence, although the focus is primarily on the perceptions and beliefs of right-
wing activists, we decided to incorporate contents that these groups disseminated through 
digital media networks and platforms.  
A Rebellion of the Oppressed?: The Perceived Rise of the Right-Wing in Brazil 
The discussion below is based on a preliminary analysis of the interviews. The most striking 
feature was that the interviewees constructed a simplified narrative, portraying themselves as 
victims of a dominant ideology –the perceived left-wing agenda of the PT–, and that thanks to 
their cunning  and continuous efforts, they were capable of liberating themselves in order to 
question their view of the status quo. We divided the narrative into three interrelated 
chronological stages: Victimization, Conscientization, Liberation. The first stage, 
‘victimization’ summarizes the feeling of ‘ideological’ oppression formulated in interviews, 
against the backdrop of a supposed sociocultural domination of left-wing ideas in Brazil. The 
second one, ‘conscientization’, describes the process of becoming aware of themselves as a 
group, sharing this common feeling and reinforcing this narrative of victimization. The third 
one refers to a sectarian ‘liberation’, where the right-wing position is unleashed.  
As seen throughout the interviews, whilst the narrative proposed by these individuals 
appears to be an ideological reversal of Freire’s philosophy on the oppressed –which Freire 
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portrayed as intrinsically associated with the left (2005[1970])–, it echoes only in form, albeit 
not in substance, the perception that groups marginalized by dominant ideologies require 
securing critical consciousness in order to change power structures. The view of the world of 
these individuals was characterized by the perception of an impossibility or at least extreme 
difficulty of dialogue with the left –at least according to the interviewees–, thus portraying each 
other as enemies rather than political adversaries. Such a perceived impossibility of dialogue 
has arguably played a crucial role throughout the process of pernicious polarization that has 
characterized Brazil over the last decade. 
Victimization: The Right-Wing Constructed as the Oppressed 
Most MBL activists stated that they felt stigmatized for being ‘right-wing’, which they 
understood as being attached to conservative values and neo-liberalism. Their perception was 
that during the PT governments, particularly those led by Lula da Silva (2002-2010), it was 
extremely difficult to voice criticisms of those in power. This was partly due to the moderately 
optimistic climate dominating Brazil that followed the country’s period of political and 
economic stability, its successful reduction of poverty, and its more significant profile on the 
international arena during the first decade of this century (Montero, 2014). In this context, 
founders of the MBL told us that ‘libertarian’ ideas contradicted what for them was the status 
quo, namely, the apparently unquestionable governability and popularity of Lula and the PT: 
People engaged with the diffusion of libertarian ideas don’t have a clue about what public opinion was like 
years ago. I realized that I was a libertarian between 2004 and 2005, and I remember very well how it felt 
back then. Lula’s approval ratings were something like ninety per cent, even after the Mensalão, that was 
a major corruption scandal that happened during his first term, and Lula could still manage to get re-elected 
(“Rodrigo”, founder of the MBL, interviewed in 2016). 
I read about the [social welfare programme] Bolsa Família and I asked a friend of mine who was really 
talking about it all the time, ‘why is Bolsa Família so good?’. And he said to me ‘What a fascist you are!’. 
I didn’t know anything about it, I am asking innocently and honestly, and I get insulted. [...] And then, he 
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started to label me, like ‘If you are questioning Bolsa Família, it is because you are from the white elite’, 
you know what I mean? (“Júlio”, member of the MBL since 2014, interviewed in 2017) 
Members of the MBL therefore narrate the past as an oppressive time, when views 
questioning what for them was the dominant ideology –the one promoted by the PT 
government– were shut down and rejected. This sense of victimization is nonetheless 
contradicted by evidence showing that the policies of the PT were far from maintaining the 
status quo. Brazilian media organizations developed for instance a tense relationship with the 
governing centre-left authorities, stressing corruption accusations, populism and 
authoritarianism (de Albuquerque, 2019). MBL members emphasized nonetheless their sense 
of being stigmatized. As another founder recalled: 
Being a right-winger in 2004 in a college environment was a greater taboo than it is today, especially 
considering that we were students of a Law School actively engaged in the struggle against the military 
dictatorship. So we tried to act like we were independents, anarchists, and it worked, because we won the 
elections for the student body (“Augusto”, founder of the MBL, interviewed in 2016). 
Whilst the above quote echoes the previous narrative of marginalization, it also shows 
the measures needed to overcome it. It is noteworthy that MBL members disguised themselves 
as independents or anarchists in order to gradually secure positions of power, such as the student 
body of that particular university. This was partly because right-wing positions were associated 
with the military dictatorship. Notably, when the MBL was founded a decade later, some 
members admitted struggling with promoting right-wing ideas, because they were perceived as 
boring and unattractive:  
We sat together [with two other leaders, in 2014] to talk and we understood we had the same vision of 
the world. Then, we had this crazy idea to start an enterprise, a start-up, to promote our ideas and world 
vision with a more attractive packaging. Back in the days, everything connected to this vision was boring, 
or technically difficult to understand, connected with the economy. They were simply not appealing 
(“Vinicius”, interviewed in 2016). 
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According to “Vinicius”, right-wing ideas –essentially those associated with 
neoliberalism– were generally considered dull, technical and too rational in comparison with 
the emotional appeal of those from the left. Although the narrative of oppression is apparent in 
this quote, it is noteworthy that the proposed solution is explicitly stated in market terms: the 
MBL was going to become an ‘enterprise, a start-up’, providing an ‘attractive packaging’ of 
their political views. The possibility of freedom and liberation proposed by the MBL therefore 
emerges from the antithesis of Freire’s philosophy, namely the commercial transaction of ideas. 
For the MBL, politics were perceived as a market where particular viewpoints could be bought 
and sold. This contrasts with Freire’s politics of hope, based not only on producing social 
change by collective action, but more fundamentally by stressing that those changes should aim 
to produce a fairer society (see Waisbord, this issue), free from a dominant market logic. Later 
in life, Freire expressed concern about the pervasiveness of neoliberalism across different fields 
of life, calling for people ‘to refuse the dictatorship of the marketplace, founded as it is on the 
perverse ethic of profit’ (Freire, 1998, p. 115; see also Roberts, 2003; Singh, 2008).  
Conscientization: Articulating the Right-Wing through Digital Media 
In addition to the perception of being victims, MBL members also stressed throughout the 
interviews the significance of the ‘affordances’ of digital communication technologies for the 
coordination and articulation of the Brazilian right-wing. This is a significant observation, 
particularly in view that, until very recently, scholarship used to describe the internet as a 
technology with the potential to help the marginalized (Singh, 2008), and social media networks 
as tools through which primarily progressive forces coordinated actions and disseminated 
information (e.g. d’Andrea and Ziller, 2015). Whilst academic attention emphasized how left-
wing activists employed digital media, the interviewees revealed that right-wing groups were 
using them early on, not only to react against what they perceived to be the social dominant 
discourse, but also to develop what on the surface appears to be ‘conscientization’ (Freire, 
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2005[1970]), with them securing an awareness as supposed victims of a leftist status quo. As 
two of them told us: 
I remember an Orkut’s community. I was not part of it. I was not taking part in the debates just reading 
comments. However, I remember its name well; it appealed to me a lot, it was I am right-winger, so what? 
Back in the day, being a right-winger was still looked upon poorly, something to be blamed for, something 
odd. It was like being left-wing was the only good position to have. I followed the conversations because 
I was really interested in the question of ‘how come being right-wing is wrong?’ I wanted to understand, 
but I did not participate (“Daniel”, MBL activist, interviewed in 2017). 
I was an active member since Orkut’s time. I remember the Mensalão scandal [in 2005]. Obviously, I 
wasn’t surprised. But at the time, I used Orkut’s communities to insult the PT and criticize Lula, saying 
that he was going to be put in jail, etc. [...] Later on, I was also in two groups on Facebook. One was a 
left-winger group and the other one was a right-winger group that we had created. In these groups, we 
discussed politics, published stuff, and both were public, not private (“Bruno”, MBL activist, interviewed 
in 2018). 
Like “Daniel” and “Bruno”, most interviewees stated that they began to be politically 
active online around 2005 or 2006, after the aforementioned Mensalão corruption scandal, 
through blogs as well as Orkut, a highly popular social media platform in Brazil at that time. 
Several digital communities with names such as the aforementioned Eu sou de direita, e daí? 
(I’m a right-winger, so what?) were created, along with others such as Liberalismo verdadeiro 
(Real liberalism) or Fora Lula! (Lula out!). Notably, and despite the then academic 
enchantment with the internet as an apparently progressive force, some of these communities 
had more followers than their left-wing counterparts. Whilst in 2006 PT-supportive Lula 
Presidente 2006 had thirty thousand followers, Fora Lula 2006 had around one-hundred-ten 
thousand members (Motta, 2006; Terra, 2006). It is notable that some, like “Bruno”, were also 
active members of left-wing online groups. Hence, it cannot be said that they were part of a 
‘filter bubble’, exposed exclusively to similar views (Pariser, 2011). Yet their engagement with 
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other viewpoints cannot be understood as dialogue either, at least in the Freirean sense. When 
they were ‘insulting the PT and criticizing Lula’, basic elements of dialogue, such as listening 
to the other and mutual respect, were absent. In consequence, several members of the MBL 
engaged in a sectarian digital monologue, not isolated from other opinions, but nonetheless 
closed off within one particular view of the world.  
When Orkut’s popularity in Brazil vanished, these communities migrated to Facebook, 
where other groups were created to share allegedly ‘subversive’ content, such as classic 
literature on libertarianism and neoliberalism. In line with previous studies (Rocha, 2019; Davis 
and Straubhaar, 2020), the internet sheltered these groups, permitting them to develop a 
common identity and conscience based on conservative and neoliberal values. As the quotes 
below illustrate: 
I became more interested in politics and I looked on the internet about capitalism and communism […] I 
got overwhelmed and kept looking for more and more. In Brazil, we have these discussion groups on social 
media, we called them patotas, and that’s what we called a closed group of intellectuals. Because the right 
was seen in Brazil as a military’s stuff, these groups were really closed for us. But, with social media, access 
was easier and was possible to discuss with them (“Rafael”, MBL activist, interviewed in 2016). 
I was in a faculty where people were more inclined to be left-wingers. Then, you join a movement that they 
hated [the MBL], it was really complicated. The atmosphere was really hostile, I lost lots of friends. But 
there is a counterpart of this: I gained a lot of new friends, from all over Brazil, good people who make you 
feel welcome and like you, people who identify with you. I didn’t know there were so many people 
believing in our claim. So, it was worth it (“Isabella”, MBL activist, interviewed in 2016). 
 
The words of “Rafael” and “Isabella” show how, as mentioned earlier, digital 
technologies facilitated what appears to be a process of ‘conscientization’, with members of the 
right-wing aiming to overcome their limitations (Freire, 1974, 2005[1970]). Sensing a lack of 
representation but also a lack of respect within political, journalistic and academic circles, 
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digital networks and platforms became a space not only of shared awareness of a perceived 
subordinate status, but most significantly a space –as discussed in the next section– where they 
could put their thoughts into practice, in order to ‘liberate’ themselves and ascend to positions 
of power.   
Liberation: Battling the Left-Wing 
The aforementioned demonstrations calling for the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff were a 
turning point for the right-wing in Brazil. MBL activists stated throughout the interviews that 
the protests showed them that they were no longer political outcasts, and should therefore stop 
being ashamed of opposing the PT. The right-wing, and the MBL in particular, grew stronger 
during 2015 and 2016, with their ideas becoming more socially visible. As one MBL activist 
recalled: 
Little by little, we succeeded in reaching the public and showing them that liberalism is not about the 
dictatorship period. I believe this is our objective now. We want to touch young people, supposedly 
already politicized, and show them that the right-wing’s position can be something good too (“Rafael”, 
MBL activist, interviewed in 2016). 
Yet showing other people that the right could be ‘something good too’ meant in practice 
that their antagonistic and mutually exclusive political positions and identities advanced beyond 
fringe groups and became part of Brazil’s overall political discourse (Rocha, 2019; Davis and 
Straubhaar, 2020). Significantly, interviewees such as “Rafael” stressed that their support for 
the right-wing was purely based on their opposition to political corruption and defense of 
national values, but the contents that the MBL produced and circulated in and through the media 
tell a different story. Photos, memes, videos and texts actually intended to mock or even offend 
the left, depicting the latter as an enemy to be defeated and Dilma Rousseff as a symbolic figure 
to topple. As an MBL leader stated in 2017, during the third national congress of this 
organization in São Paulo:  
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I always say that we’ve created ‘memes of massive destruction.’ The left is like, ‘no, cultural war doesn’t 
exist.’ Yes! It does. We are entering a decentralized world and the right is building a counterculture on 
the internet. 
As shown by the above quote, contents circulating online arguably both expressed and 
strengthened the process of political polarization in Brazil, to the point that memes were 
compared to weapons that were part of a ‘cultural war’ between the right and the left, with the 
former attempting to neutralize the latter. A flyer given by the MBL during the occupation of 
the National Congress in Brasília is illustrative (Figure 1). It showcases the lyrics for several 
songs that depict the left, and the PT in particular, as economically ignorant, as hypocrites for 
having iPhones and cars, and Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff as corrupt authoritarian figures. 
These accusations were not new. They had been voiced by Brazil’s national media since the 
first Lula government (de Albuquerque, 2019), but are taken here to a whole new level, with 
left-wingers portrayed not as adversaries, but as an enemy with whom it is impossible and 
unproductive to relate. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Figure 1 - Flyer distributed by the MBL during the occupation of the National Congress in Brasília in November 
2015. Photo: Fanny Vrydagh. 
Other images produced and circulated by the MBL are in a similar vein. One associated 
the PT governments with the Maduro regime in Venezuela (Figure 2), stressing that the 
inefficiency of the latter would be replicated if the Workers’ Party remained in power in Brazil. 
Another one contrasted two popular bands in the country, with the one supporting the 
impeachment labelled as ‘legends’, and the other supporting Rousseff as ‘rubbish’ (Figure 3).  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE  
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Figure 2 –Meme associating the PT governments with the Maduro regime in Venezuela. It says, 'Venezuela has 
raw material to produce medicines only until the end of April. Is this the example of socialism that the PT, PSOL 
and PCDOB want for Brazil?'. Source: MBL Facebook page, April 2016. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Figure 3 – Meme comparing two popular bands in Brazil, with the one supporting Dilma Rousseff's 
impeachment labelled as 'legends', and the one opposing it called 'rubbish'. Source: MBL Facebook page, April 
2016. 
The images are thus a clear expression of pernicious polarization, with the other –in this 
case, the left– delegitimized in simplistic and offensive terms, portrayed not as a valid 
adversary, but rather a foe not worthy to be listened to. And yet, the discourse among MBL 
members depicted themselves simply as protectors of ‘common sense’, as representatives and 
even ‘liberators’ of the majority of Brazilians, whom –according to the interviewees– were 
oppressed by the power of a supposed left-wing status quo: 
The ideas we were defending at this time were ideas sharing by all the population. But, at first no one 
believed it was possible, and we’ve made it. We got them out of power and cut relations with the 
Bolivarian countries. All of this were things people wanted but at the same time, believed it would never 
happen (“Gustavo”, MBL activist, interviewed in 2016). 
Despite the narrative of oppression present in the interviews, it should be noted that the 
experiences of the interviewees differ significantly from the philosophy of Paulo Freire. Firstly, 
various right-wing online communities received organizational support from think-tanks in 
order to take to the streets and secure seats in Congress (Rocha, 2019). Hence, they were not 
experiencing material scarcity and were part of, following Freire’s thoughts in the Pedagogy of 
the Heart, the ‘network of power’ that dominates the production and circulation of information 
(1997, p. 57). Secondly, circumstances played in their favour. The June 2013 protests were 
originally interpreted as a triumph of democracy, but actually became a political opportunity 
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for right-wing groups to permeate Brazil’s socio-political discourses (Rocha, 2019). Thirdly, 
the closed nature of online communities –strengthened over time by changes to the Facebook 
algorithm, which emphasize ‘friends’ contents over those of publishers and news agencies 
(Cornia et al., 2018)– created a mirage of dialogue, with different individuals reinforcing their 
viewpoints and strengthening the process of pernicious polarization in Brazil. Right-wing 
activists shared through digital media their belief in being members of an oppressed group, 
crystallizing their perception that those outside ‘us’ –the left-wing– were the enemy, against 
which they had no other alternative but to stand up and reaffirm their own identities. 
Concluding Discussion: Paulo Freire and the Challenge of Facing Pernicious Polarization 
The narrative of victimization, conscientization and liberation proposed by members of the 
MBL is not uncommon among right-wing activists. In other settings, right-wing supporters 
have voiced the feeling of being oppressed by a dominant leftist status quo (e.g. Nagle, 2017). 
These groups therefore portray themselves as ‘subaltern counter-publics’, imbued with the 
awareness of being subordinated, regardless of whether or not they are actually in a subaltern 
condition (Warner, 2002). Echoing the previous discussion on pernicious polarization, 
members of these groups share identities, interests, and discourses on so much conflict with the 
perceived dominant cultural horizon –such as the supposed dominance of the PT across the 
Brazilian society– that they would face hostile reactions if they were expressed before 
audiences whose ways of life are assumed as correct, normal and universal.  
It is tempting to see the perception of subordination among these counter-publics as a 
reversal of the relationship between oppressed and oppressor discussed by Freire (2005[1970]), 
but that would be a spurious comparison. Right-wing activists were mostly part of an elitist 
segment of Brazilian society that has historically belonged to the oppressors rather than the 
oppressed, imposing their political, economic and religious views on the majority of the 
population. They may not have been in government between 2003 and 2016, but still possessed 
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plenty of material and symbolic resources, such as money, access to digital media and the 
support of think-tanks. Furthermore, their discourses echoed those put forward by Brazilian 
news conglomerates since the first Lula government, which stressed accusations of corruption, 
authoritarianism and populism against the PT administrations (de Albuquerque, 2019).  
Conditioned by the experience of traditionally being the oppressor, these individuals 
interpreted the socio-political and cultural changes that, within limitations, ended up 
transforming their previous lifestyle as victimization and marginalization. As Freire observes, 
‘the former oppressors […] genuinely feel oppressed. Conditioned by the experience of 
oppressing others, any situation other than their former seems to them like oppression’ 
(2005[1970], p. 57). Furthermore, dialogue and empathy for the other –that is, the left – were 
posed as extremely difficult or even impossible. This is a significant difference between the 
MBL and Freire’s philosophy. Although the victimization and conscientization described by 
right-wing activists seem to resemble Freire’s approach, their ‘liberation’ actually kills that 
association. For Freire, liberation is never about killing the oppressor or exchanging positions 
to become an oppressor in their place. Liberation intends to free both the oppressor and the 
oppressed (2005[1970]). The ‘liberation’ proposed by the MBL conversely proposed the 
neutralization of their perceived oppressor –Lula, Dilma, the PT–, without seeking to eliminate 
oppression itself.  
Although the oppression described by the interviewees is a construction, it still has 
social and political implications. The deepening of pernicious polarization in Brazil and the 
subsequent election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 are a clear example of the appeal –at least in part– 
of this oppression and liberation narrative to the electorate. Yet the question of how to deal not 
only with this narrative of oppression, but more fundamentally with processes of pernicious 
polarization facilitating governments such as Bolsonaro’s –which, once in power, often try to 
reinforce this narrative– has puzzled scholars all around the world. Recent discussions have 
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observed how difficult it is to find antidotes to prevent or reverse pernicious polarization. 
Protests seem to make little difference, and judicial attempts to establish limits and regulate 
social discourse have shown results only if they are applied prior to the emergence of processes 
of political polarization (McCoy and Somer, 2019). We argue nonetheless that the philosophy 
of Paulo Freire –who wrote his seminal works in a more acute polarization context – provide 
potential avenues of thought.  
Freire’s ideas about dialogue, as discussed in works such as Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
(2005[1970]) and Education as the Practice of Freedom (1974), offer a key to unlock this 
process. Firstly, in his examination of the roles of the oppressed and oppressor, Freire proposes 
uniting fundamentally and dialectically separated actors through a dialogue fueled by love, 
humility, faith in people, hope and critical thinking, and in which parties are equal 
(2005[1970]). Relatedly, as observed by some scholars (McCoy and Somer, 2019), pernicious 
polarization is relational, and depends not only on the rhetoric and actions of particular groups 
–such as right-wing organizations–, but also on how those opposing them react. Unsurprisingly, 
calling them racists, fascists, or fools who have fallen prey to fake news deepens pernicious 
polarization. In consequence, the more they are attacked by the left or the centre, the more they 
find comfort in their position of being stigmatized (Stavrakakis, 2018; McCoy and Somer, 
2019). 
However, this type of approach raises the question of how those in the left, the centre 
and moderate right can respond to the aggressive style of the extreme right –as well as the 
extreme left. Freire’s distinction of sectarianism and radicalism, and this is the second point we 
want to make, is crucial. According to Freire (1974, 2005[1970]; see also Holst, 2019), a radical 
is strongly committed to their beliefs, yet is open to dialogue and disposed towards humility 
and critical thinking. If those principles are not followed, a radical therefore becomes a 
sectarian, closed to dialogue and trapped within their own fanaticism. That was true for the 
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previously discussed online communities, where the dialogue closure contributed to the 
formation of digital ‘sects’ that portrayed the left-wing as an opposite and irreconcilable camp. 
Hence, the answer to right-wing sectarianism should not be through left-wing sectarianism 
(Holst, 2019). The unlocking of pernicious polarization should instead be achieved by radicals 
who have humility, self-critical thinking and an open mind, particularly in view of the fact that 
right-wing groups appear to be winning the debate by means of fallacious arguments. A radical 
can listen to right-wing supporters, yet that does not mean that accepts everything they say. 
Academics should also embrace a radical rather than sectarian position, and examine these 
groups not to validate their viewpoints, but to contribute to instances of dialogue that unlock 
rather than reinforce pre-existing polarized camps. A certain sectarian blindness within 
academia has for instance prevented a further examination of these groups in their genesis, 
partly due to romantic views on the power of digital media as well as due to a disparaging 
attitude towards right-wing activists. There is consequently a risk that academics may reinforce 
the demonization and marginalization of these groups, strengthening narratives of oppression 
and stopping any possibility of dialogue.  
In this article, we have shown that individuals engaged in right-wing social movements 
actually have something to say. By looking at their viewpoints through Freire’s grammar of 
oppression, we could unravel the dynamic between this feeling of oppression and their sectarian 
position. We suggest that our experience may shed some light on how to contribute to tearing 
down the wall separating these different political positions. Some steps are already being taken 
in this regard, giving some –even if moderate– hopes to be optimistic. A few scholars have 
questioned the argument that Brazil is irremediably polarized, shedding light on the multiple 
and often interrelated social and political viewpoints that Brazilians actually have (Ortellado, 
Solano and Moretto, 2016). Political actors have also engaged in this task, as illustrated by the 
production of videos discussing differences in values and beliefs between different groups 
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(Fura a bola, 2019). Furthermore, even the MBL published a mea culpa acknowledging its 
responsibilities in the development of online pernicious polarization (Lihnares and Zanini, 
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